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Neil Boyd*

The Origins of Canadian
Narcotics Legislation: The
Process of Criminalization in
Historical Context

The year 1972 saw a federal Commission investigating the
non-medical use of drugs recommend repeal of the offence of
possession of marijuana', an indication that state policy with respect
to the social control of psychoactive substances was undergoing a
thorough re-appraisal. It is not surprising, then, that the past decade
should also have seen a considerable degree of academic interest in
Canada's initial attempt to make criminal the citizen's desire to alter
consciousness.
A comprehensive review of this admirable collection of research
reveals that Canada ought not to take pride in these initial efforts.
The initial statute has been explained with reference to its "racist
and moralistic foundation", by the "galloping reformist zeal of
Mackenzie King" and by the increasing affront of "cheap Oriental
labour".2 The creation of law is viewed as the product of a process
*B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Assistant Professor, Department of Criminology, Simon
Fraser University. The author would like to thank John Lowman, Department of
Geography, University of British Columbia, for his perceptive research assistance,
and would also like to thank Simon Fraser University for the provision of a
President's Research Grant, 1979.
I. Canada, Cannabis: A Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical
Use ofDrugs (Information Canada: Ottawa, 1972).
2. These are descriptions culled from the work of M. Green, "A History of
Canadian Narcotics Control: The Formative Years", 1979 University of Toronto
Faculty of Law Review, 42-79; Solomon and Madison, "The Evolution of
Non-Medical Opiate Use in Canada - Part 1: 1870-1929" (1976-77), 5 Drug
Forum 237, and S. Small, "Canadian Narcotics Legislation, 1908-1923: A
Conflict Model Interpretation" in Greenaway and Brickey, eds. Law and Social
Control in Canada, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall: 1978), 28-42. Those interested in
the empirical origins of Canadian narcotics legislation might also want to see C. E.
Trasov, "History of the Opium and Narcotic Drug Legislation in Canada" (1962),
4 Criminal Law Quarterly 274; S. Cook, Ideology and Canadian Narcotics
Legislation, 1908-1923, unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Toronto,
1964; B. McKeown, The Development of Canadian Narcotics Legislation,
1907-1950: A Study of Interest Groups and Power Relationships, unpublished
M.A. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1966; B. MacFarlane, Drug Offences in
Canada, (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1979); G. Dolinski, The Development of
North American Drug Laws from a Marxist Perspective, unpublished manuscript,
Osgoode Hall Law School, 1979.
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of social conflict; it is not suggested that the law was the reflection
of an emerging consensus of opinion within the Canadian people. 3
What remains unclear, however, is the process of social conflict
itself; there is disagreement with respect to the modes of conflict
and the structures of power that created this legislation. Chambliss
and Dolinski have both suggested that the changing nature of
economic relationships was responsible for anti-opium legislation .
Small, Solomon and Madison, and Green have urged rather that
pluralist conflict gave rise to Canada's first prohibition of opiate
use. These authors have implied that the interactions of various
essentially unrelated interest groups produced the laws that would
control the "non-medical" use of drugs. While critical of the
premises of the anti-drug ideology of the day, these authors appear
to imply that the social democratic tradition of pluralist conflict
merely misfired in the instance of Canadian narcotics legislation.
Small, Solomon and Madison, and Green, while they give us
historical data on the process of criminalization, fail to inform us as
to what the data say about such a process in theoretical context.
Chambliss and Dolinski make the bold claim that criminalization
here was a consequence of purely materialist forces, thereby
supporting a culturally materialist, or "Marxist" 5 view of history.
Small et al. stand implicitly in opposition, suggesting nothing more
than that a plurality of interest groups unhappily shaped a statute of
repressive character.
The present work seeks to expand, both empirically and
theoretically, upon the historical context of the process of
criminalization. The empirical data have revealed a theoretical
tension - the pluralist conflict view of the process of law creation
is challenged by a view that sees economic exploitation as the
effective cause of criminalization. These two positions represent the
poles of a highly simplified ideological discourse. The rich tradition
3. All of the academic literature to date on the subject of Canadian narcotics
legislation supports the conflict model of law creation. One might fairly say that the
empirical evidence simply precludes any notion of the legislative emergence of an
informed consensus of opinion.
4. W. Chambliss, "The Political Economy of Smack: Opiates, Capitalism and
Law", 1 Research in Law and Sociology, 1975, 115-141, and see G. Dolinski,
note 2 above.
5. The use of the term "Marxist" is problematic. Dialectical materialism,
economic determinism, and state communism have all been graced with the label of
Marxism, despite their significant theoretical differences. It may be that the term
Marxist is simply too nebulous to be of explanatory utility.
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of Marxian analytic thought demands interpretation in the context of
twentieth century North America; implicit acceptance of a pluralist
conflict model reveals the mighty but problematic Hegelian notion
that a contradiction of ideas produces a social order in an
evolutionary context.
It is suggested that materialist and ideational analyses of the
process of criminalization are most appropriately viewed as
complementary and not as competing constructions of social
reality. 6 As Robert Heilbroner has noted 7 , it can be said that not
only did Marx turn the Hegelian construct on its head, but so too, in
retrospect, does Hegel dislocate the consistency of Marx.
In the context of the emergence of Canadian narcotics legislation
it can be seen that while material life created contradictions that
required political decisions, it was ideational life that attempted the
resolution of capital's contradictions. It is to an empirical
substantiation of this hypothesis that we now turn.
I. The Evolution of NarcoticsLegislation
It is only since 1908 that the social control of altered states of
consciousness has been, perhaps unwittingly, a state priority in
Canada. The initial two-section statute prohibited the importation,
manufacture, and sale of opium and established a penalty of not less
than fifty dollars for contravention of the Act. 8 A maximum penalty
of three years imprisonment was also provided for. Sale of existing
opium stocks was allowed for six months following the statute's
enactment, apparently as a concession to the merchants of the
industry. 9
The next twenty-one years would see the institutionalization of
the ideology of criminalization, a development which has been the
subject of much critical scrutiny. 10 Melvyn Green has most recently
said of these "formative years" that "The process of legislative
revision eventually led to a moral redefinition of narcotic drug use.
6. See P. L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966).
7. R. Heilbroner, Marxism ForAnd Against (Norton Press: New York, 1980), pp.
33-37.
8. 7-8 Edward VII, s.c. 1908, c. 50, s. 1.
9. Green argues that the work of the Senate prompted this concession, a concern
for the "legitimate investments of opium manufacturers". M. Green, supra, note 2
at 47.
10. See note 2, supra. See most especially M. Green and Solomon and Madison,
amplifications of the exploratory work begun by Shirley Small.
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What was once viewed as a private indulgence came to be regarded
almost universally as a public evil. Contrary to what might be
expected, it was changes in the criminal law that brought about the
transformation of public attitudes, and not the converse
proposition." 1
Green, though he surely appreciates the social contexts in which
law arises, here presents what might be best characterized as a
deceptively attractive hypothesis. While one cannot quarrel with the
fact of moral re-definition of opiate use, one is hard pressed to find
evidence to support the notion that it is the law that has transformed
public attitudes. As William Chambliss has noted, "The law may
be hallowed but it does not exist in a vacuum". 2 The assertion that
law can transform public attitudes is tantamount to a reification of
law; it ignores the human medium through which law is both
enacted and enforced.
The claim that law can create public attitudes is thus problematic:
it too easily excuses human beings for their actions and implies the
absence of an often cited dialectical relationship - social life as
both a construction of reality, and as a reality in the process of
construction. 13 The assertion that law can transform public attitudes
is more an attribution of blame than it is a description of events in
historical context; there is a need to scratch this surface.
1. The Decision to Criminalize 1870-1908; The Social Control of
ConsumerPreference
In 1879 one had to pay the city of Vancouver $500 if one wanted to
enter the business of dealing in opium. 14 The profits were lucrative
and the city felt that it had a right to a certain percentage of the
annual take. Federal records indicate that tens of thousands of
pounds of crude opium were imported annually into Canada from
1876 to 1908.15 This opium was principally destined for Caucasian
pharmaceutical companies and Chinese opium factories in British
Columbia. The Chinese opium factories produced smoking opium;
11. M. Green, note 2, supra, at 43.
12. W. Chambliss, note 4, supra, at 115.
13. This is a point that is made throughout Berger and Luckmann, note 6, supra.
See especially p. 207-211.
14. See Trasov, note 2, supra, Green, note 2, supra.
15. Statement Showing the Quantity and Value of Opium Imported into Canada
During the Fiscal Years 1867 to 1908 Inclusive, Public Archives of Canada,
Department of Customs, C.M.G. 26, J-4, Vol. 30, Ottawa, 1908.
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the pharmaceutical companies produced opiated tonics, elixirs,
cough syrups, analgesics, and patent medicines. 16 The Caucasian
pharmaceutical companies did not pay the $500 licensing fee
expected of opium merchants; they were naturally not perceived as
such. 17 The Caucasian intake for relief from pain was legally
differentiated from the Chinese intake in pursuit of pleasure. The
settings and circumstances in which one used opiates were of
qualitative importance; the racial origin of the merchant was also
naturally a variable of significance. Most important, though, was
the international backdrop against which British Columbia opiate
use was emerging.
In 1839 and in 1856 Britain had gone to war against China in
order to preserve and expand British India trade in opium.' 8 As a
consequence of the Chinese defeat in 1856, Britain ultimately
managed to obtain from China the legalization of opium smoking
and trading within Chinese boundaries in 1958; 19 China, however,
managed to obtain the right to impose taxes on opium imported
from India. As Chambliss has noted, "Legalization
(ironically) . . . planted the seed that would eventually destroy the
profits and the British opium monopoly. For with legalization came
(a) taxes and (b) the legal right of Chinese farmers to grow their
own opium. Competition would shortly ruin the hard-won right to
20
import opium from India into China."
The period of transition was, nevertheless, of some 50 years
duration: it was not until the early twentieth century that the opium
trade shifted from India to South China and the Golden Triangle. At
the time of Canada's first anti-opium legislation, British India's
profits from opium were still substantial, though competition from
China was obviously increasing. By the 1880's the Chinese
province of Szechwan was harvesting an estimated ten thousand
21
tons of raw opium annually.
16. See Solomon and Madison, note 2, supra at 238. See also the Vancouver
Province, selected advertisements, 1900-1907, Vancouver, B.C. for primary
source data.
17. See the City of Vancouver by-laws, consolidated 1879.
18. For a good discussion of China's development in the late nineteenth century
see Jean Chesneaux et al., China From the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution
(New York: Panthean Books, 1976).
19. See A. W. McCoy et al., The Politicsof Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York:
Harper Row, 1972) at 63.
20. Chambliss, note 4, supra, at 120.
21. McCoy et al., note 11, supra, at 64.
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On the domestic front, the latter half of the 19th century saw
substantial Chinese immigration into both California and British
Columbia. The Chinese of 1870 British Columbia were welcome
additions to the owners of West Coast industry in a time of labour
shortage; the Chinese were industrious workers with few financial
expectations. 2 2 The Chinese opium habit was initially only of
financial interest to the municipal, provincial, and federal
governments; the new opium business amounted to one more means
of raising government revenues.
As Solomon and Madison have pointed out, "The tolerant
attitude towards the Chinese, and Chinese opium smoking lasted
only as long as the labour shortage. The decline in railroad
construction and the end of the gold rush reduced job opportunities,
first in California during the 1870's and subsequently in British
Columbia during the 1880's. The Chinese, once welcomed as a
cheap source of labour, were now resented for this very reason.
White labour could not compete with the Chinese workers, who
were unmarried and lived frugally. It was not the white businessman
were
who was blamed, but the Chinese labourers he hired, for they
23
willing to work for a salary a white man could not live on."
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, then, the British in
India were losing control of the lucrative opium trade; the Chinese
of British Columbia were finding increasing hostility in the infant
nation state of Canada. Chambliss has argued that, "As the opium
trade became less profitable for Europeans (most importantly the
British), anti-opium legislation began to appear in most Western
countries. A series of International Opium Conferences. .

.

. were

the consequence of the changing economic realities which helped
24
spread anti-opium sentiment and subsequent legislation."
Chambliss has urged the radical hypothesis that criminalization of
opium occurred as a consequence of its declining profitability in the
West. By shutting down potential markets for expanding Chinese
opium production, the West could help to minimize the economic
gains that China could make as a consequence of its emerging
22. The Chinese made a good deal less than the whites in Canada but still some ten
times what they could be making, had they remained in China. This differential is
documented by the Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire Into The
Methods By Which OrientalLabourers Have Been Induced To Come To Canada
(Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1908), at p. 70.
23. Solomon and Madison, note 2, supra, at 240.
24. Chambliss, note 4, supra, at 192.
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control of the opium market. The Canadian experience of
criminalization can lend little support to the Chambliss hypothesis,
though, as we shall see later, it does reveal that domestic economic
concerns were an integral force in Canada's early efforts.
The year 1885 saw both declining employment opportunities on
the West Coast and the appointment of a Federal Royal Commission
on Chinese immigration. 25 The Commission proposed a $50 tax on
most Chinese entering the country; 2 6 the proposal was enacted
within the year. 27 In 1901 the tax was increased to $100, in 1904 to
$500.28 This can now be seen as a kind of interference with the
labour pool of West Coast industry, necessitated by the clamouring
of the economically vulnerable white working class.
The Chinese Immigration Act of 1900 had exempted Chinese
merchants, Chinese men of science, and Chinese students from
payment of the $100 entry tax; it was only the Chinese who would
labour for West Coast industrialists who would be subject to such a
penalty for admission. 29 As the tax on Chinese labourers increased,
there was a dramatic decline in Chinese immigration - and a
dramatic increase in Japanese immigration. The voice of the white
working class had temporarily stemmed the tide of Chinese
immigration, but the owners of industry were now managing to
acquire the alternative of cheap Japanese labour. 30 Japanese
admissions increased from none in 1904 to just under 2,000 in 1906
to over 7,500 in 1908.31
Mackenzie King, appointed in 1908 to inquire into the methods
by which Oriental labourers had been induced to come to Canada,
revealed a comprehensive understanding of the interactions of
labour, government, and the owners of industry. 32 The $500 entry
25. For a good description of the importance of the federal Commission see Green,
Solomon and Madison, Cook, and Trasov, note 2, supra.
26. Chinese merchants, Chinese men of science and Chinese students would not be
required to make such a payment for admission.
27. The ChineseImmigrationAct, 1885, s.c. 1885, c.7 1, s.4.
28. The ChineseImmigration Act, s.c. 1904.
29. Section 6 (a) (b) and (c) of the 1900 Act set out the exemptions from entry tax
in the case of Chinese immigrants.
30. Chinese immigration decreased from over 5,000 in 1903 and over 4,000 in
1904 to under 100 in 1905. Canada, The Canada Year Book, 1932, (Ottawa,
1932).
31. Canada, The Canada Year Book, 1932 (Ottawa, 1932).
32. While King most often blurred the distinction between "moral" tones and
physiological effects in consideration of various drugs, he is often revealed here as
an astute practitioner of political economy.
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tax, King observed, was having the effect of creating greater
bargaining power for the Chinese immigrants already resident in
Canada prior to 1904. The tax had effectively cut off Chinese
immigration; the "coolie labourer", willing to work for substantially less than the white labourer, was always a highly useful
energy source for Canadian corporations. By 1906 the average wage
of the Chinese labourer had gone from $30 per month to $65 per
month - an increase of over 100 percent in less than two years. The
Chinese labourer, while still earning less than the white labourer,
had at least marginally diminished the economic power of the
owners of industry; there was an acknowledgment of utility.
King was also able to astutely forecast the ultimate irony that the
$500 tax would impose. The Chinese labourer, King noted, could
save a life's earnings in China after working in Canada for a few
years. The newly affluent would then be able to afford to bring over
friends and relatives or to return and sponsor the coming of other
Chinese. From 1904 to 1913 Chinese immigration would grow from
77 annually to 7,445 annually. 33 The $500 entry tax, designed as an
appeasement for the fears of white workers, in fact created a labour
monopoly of sorts for the Chinese workers already in British
Columbia. This labour monopoly, King noted, when coupled with
the value of Canadian currency in China, would allow Chinese
immigration to continue strongly from 1908 onwards. 34 In fact, it
was not until 1923 that an exclusionary immigration policy was
35
finally arrived at.
On the international front, the dawn of the twentieth century saw
the Central Government of China beginning to sound the alarm on
opium. The Imperial Decree of September, 1906, read, in
translation:
Since the restrictions against the use of opium were removed, the
poison of this drug has practically permeated the whole of China.
The opium smoker wastes time and neglects his work, . .. and
impoverishes his family, and the poverty and weakness which for
the past few decades have been daily increasing amongst us are
undoubtedly attributable to this cause. . . at a moment when we
are striving to strengthen the Empire, it behooves us to admonish
the people . . It is hereby commanded that within a period of

33. See note 30, supra.
34. Report of the Royal Commission, note 22, supraat 68-73.
35. The ChineseImmigrationAct, S.C. 1923, c.38.
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ten years the evils arising from foreign and native opium be
equally and completely eradicated. 36
Those who had the power of government were telling the people of
China to relinquish the indulgence of opium, in order to effect what
was perceived as a need for greater economic productivity.
The Manchu dynasty had launched a vast program of reform at
the beginning of the twentieth century. As Chesneaux et al. have
noted, "Reform was intended to create a modem state by
developing centralization, specialization and information." ' 3 7 The
Imperial Decree of January, 1901 announced, "The teachings
handed down to us by our sacred ancestors are really the same as
those upon which the wealth and power of European countries have
been based, but China has hitherto failed to realize this and has been
content to acquire the rudiments of European languages or
technicalities, while changing nothing of her ancient habits of
inefficiency. ." .38

In 1906, an estimated 13 million opium smokers in a population
of some 400 million people was seen as symptomatic of such
inefficiency. 39 Those in favour of expanding material production in
China had the power of government; they had decreed that the social
control of a consumer preference was a necessity. The use of a
dream-inducing sedative was incompatible with the vision of an
emerging industrial state.
Indeed the use of such a sedative could be seen as inimical to the
interests of any who might aspire to power. Both the materialist
revolutionary and the guardian of the status quo must ultimately
prohibit such an alteration of consciousness. 4 0
On January 27, 1908, Britain and China entered into an
agreement intended to bring about just such a prohibition - the
world-wide cessation of the opium trade - an agreement that can
36. British Documents to the Shanghai Commission; Mackenzie King Papers,
Public Archives of Canada, 1909 at c. 136-139.
37. "China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution", note 18, supra, at
345.
38. Ibid, at 380.
39. Taylor, Arnold, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic 1900-1939
(Duke University Press: Durham, North Carolina, 1969), at 6.
40. Those who are interested in the attainment of power must not weaken such
resolve. In addition they must shun the possibility of the psychological
ambivalence necessarily induced by a non-ordinary consciousness. As Harvard
trained physician Andrew Weil has noted, ". . .when we enter nonordinary reality,
our relationship to the pairs of opposites changes. Instead of trying to hold one and
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now perhaps facetiously be cast as the 10 percent solution. 4 ' The
British would bind themselves to reducing opium exports from India
at the rate of 10 percent per year, for a period of three years; China
would in turn reduce production of its opium at a similar rate. The
ultimate goal of the agreement, if the initial three year period should
prove satisfactory, was to stamp out the "evil" of opium addiction
within ten years.
Economic interests most obviously precluded the immediate
cessation of the trade. Mackenzie King's correspondence reveals
Canadian doubts about the ultimate efficacy of the internationally
sanctioned 10 percent solution. King wrote that, "Much has been
said about the ten year period being too long. The conviction I
reached while in Shanghai, was that if in ten years the traffic were
wiped out it would be the most remarkable reform in the matter of
time the world had ever known .. .As it is, it means almost an
industrial revolution to effect the change desired in the period of ten
years.' '42
The King Diaries further reveal King's awareness of the
economic interests that necessitated a gradual reduction of the
international trade in opium. He noted that, "So far as the effect in
India was concerned it meant of course, the loss of considerable
revenue to the Indian Government, but what was the greater
problem, it meant the loss of almost the entire revenue to some of
the native states. The natives who had been accustomed to this
export trade for years could not understand why it should be
stopped. The moral aspect of it was not as apparent to them as to
US."

4 3

shun the other, we are able to transcend both, to experience them as two phases of
manifestation of a single reality. . ." Weil, interestingly enough, argues against
drug use, viewing it as premised upon the erroneous belief that there need be a
chemical ingestion for mental and emotional highs. Weil argues compellingly that a
more humanly ambitious society might try to find its own highs, independent of
chemical stimulation. There is a need to realize the possibility of a mental basis for
chemical events. Andrew Weil, The Natural Mind (Houghton Mifflin: Boston,
1972).
41. The 10 percent solution was, of course, anything but a solution. It merely
documented the existence of a tension between the owners of the industry and the
Chinese government - a tension that is still being played out today in somewhat
altered form (different state, different sets of consumers).
42. Letter to Mrs. W. Cummings, December 31, 1909, Mackenzie King, Personal
Correspondence, 1909, Public Archives of Canada, at 10243-10245.
43. King Diaries, Mission to the Orient, 1907-1909, Mackenzie King Papers,
PublicArchives of Canada,at 202-203.
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The 10 percent solution, then, was necessitated by the fact that
entire states in India and entire provinces in China derived almost all
revenue from the production and marketing of opium; in an
essentially monolithic economy the economic cessation of the trade
could not be ignored.
The 10 percent solution, while motivated by a sincere desire to
stamp out opium, had the ironic effect of putting yet more money
into the pockets of owners of the industry. As the British Councillor
Leech wrote from Peking in June of 1908:
From various quarters in China it is announced that the price of
foreign opium is rising, and this increase is likely to continue in
proportion to the reduction of production in China and of
importation from abroad, except in the somewhat improbable
contingency of the demand for the drug decreasing proportionately to the reduction of supply. There can be no doubt that
foreign opium is superior both in quality and strength to the
native product, consequently a great stimulus will be given to
smuggling in a country
where people attach more importance to
44
quality than to price.
The 10 percent solution had given rise to the creation of false
scarcity - a mechanism which would ensure British opium
merchants a substantial and continuing return from a lucrative
market.
Such long-term kindness was not to be visited upon the Chinese
opium merchant in British Columbia, for though the 10 percent
solution would boost the prices of B.C. opium, the social milieu in
which Canadian legislation was to take place would ultimately
preclude the possibility of such a lengthy concession. The literature
to date on "the formative years" of Canadian narcotics legislation
has suggested that the Anti-Asiatic Riot of 1907 indirectly gave rise
to opiate criminalization in Canada; it is to a detailed consideration
45
of this sequence of events that we now turn.
In July of 1907 over 1500 Japanese arrived in the province of
British Columbia, more than double the number of such admissions
in any of the previous six months. 4 6 Mackenzie King would later
learn that several emigration agencies in Vancouver had accepted
44. "British Documents to the Shanghai Commission", note 33, supra, Letter
from Peking, June, 1908.
45. Melvyn Green uses the term "formative years" to apply to the period
1870-1929. It is within this period that we see the ideology of criminalization of
"drug" use. See Green, note 2, supra.
46. Report of the Royal Commission, note 19, supra.
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contracts to supply cheap Japanese labour for large Canadian
corporations. 4 7 By late July both the provincial press and the
Vancouver Trades and Labour Council were greatly agitated. The
Vancouver Province featured daily articles on the Oriental
"invasion"; the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council formed the
Asiatic Exclusion League and began to hold public meetings.48
Through the month of August provincial politicians took to the
hustings in support of Anti-Asiatic sentiment. The Liberal member
for Vancouver, R.G. McPherson, wrote to Laurier, "It is the last
thing I want to be, but I can see without any difficulty the Province
of British Columbia slipping into the hands of Asiatics and this part
49
of Western Canada no longer a part and parcel of the Dominion."
It was in the context of this rampant paranoia that the Anti-Asiatic
riot of September, 1907, was to take place. The Asiatic Exclusion
League, inspired by the economic fears of the white workers, held a
large protest rally at City Hall on the night of September 7th. A
problem which was essentially of an economic origin was being
translated into a problem of racial "domination".
A crowd of 9,000 converged on City Hall; an immediate end to
all immigration from Asia was demanded. The angry mob drifted
from the meeting into the Chinese district and within a period of
four hours the Chinese and Japanese quarters of Vancouver had
50
sustained substantial property damage.
The Deputy-Minister of Labour, Mackenzie King, was sent to
Vancouver in October of 1907 to satisfy Japanese claims for losses
incurred; settlement of Chinese claims was not considered a priority
at the time. 51 King wrote to Laurier while in Vancouver, "The
feeling in this city and in the other parts of the Province wherever I
have been, is very generally strong anti-Japanese. I believe it is no
47. Ibid.
48. The history of the 1907 Anti-Asiatic riot is especially well documented in W.
P. Ward, White Canada Forever: British Columbia's Response to Orientals
1858-1914, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University, 1973, 194-217.
49. Letter to Laurier, quoted from Laurier papers in "White Canada Forever", at
196, note 46, supra.
50. "White Canada Forever", note 48, supra, at 202.
51. Ward, note 48, supra, has argued that "While Laurier felt compelled to
reimburse the Japanese for their losses, he felt no similar need to meet Chinese
claims. Evidently China's lack of international prestige, her less aggressive efforts
to protect the welfare of her citizens overseas, and her more distant relations with
Canada and the Empire led him to conclude that they could be treated with less
respect and charity." (at 211).
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longer merely a labour, but has become a race agitation. . . the fact
that the Japanese have proven themselves the equal of the white man
in so many ways has caused people of all classes to fear their
competition. Nothing has surprised me more than to find, in
conversation with persons who have every reason to wish for an
increase in the available supply of labour a very decided opinion
that other than Japanese labourers must be sought." ' 52 King
recognized, then, that the impetus for fears of racial domination had
an economic origin.
In the spring of 1908 King returned to Vancouver to settle claims
for Chinese losses, a settlement for which he had pushed some six
months prior. He had been distressed by Laurier's refusal to
consider Chinese claims. "It looked as tho' we were afraid of the
power of the people (the Japanese) - that fear not justice was the
motive", King stated. 53 It was the Chinese, then, who were at the
bottom of the social and economic pecking order of 1908 British
Columbia; it was the rights of the Chinese that appeared as most
vulnerable at this time.
In the course of settling claims from Chinese merchants, King
received two requests for compensation from Vancouver opium
manufacturers. The dialogue on May 27, 1908, between Lee
Theung, manager of the Lee Yuen Opium Company, and
Mackenzie King gives some insight into King's concerns.
"Question: Many white people buy it? Answer: Some. Q. How
many? A. Some buy lots and some buy small. Q. Who are the best
customers, white people or Chinese? A. White people. Q. Do you
sell more opium to white people than you do to Chinese?
54
A. Yes."
King's general reaction to the opium business was documented in
the next morning's Vancouver Province. "Prosperous Chinese
merchants startle King", said the newspaper of King's first
acquaintance with the Chinese opium industry. 55 The day's
hearings would see a focus given to Commissioner King's concerns.
The Vancouver Province of May 29, 1908, reported a perceived
52. Letter to Laurier, Nov. 9, 1907, Laurier Papers,Public Archives of Canada,
131662-64.
53. King Diaries, October 12, 1907, King Papers, Public Archives of Canada, at
C 2108.
54. Minutes of the Settlement of Chinese Claims, King Papers,Public Archives of
Canada, c. 31592-31598.
55. Vancouver Province, May 28, 1908, Vancouver, British Columbia, p. 1.
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need of a better licensing system for Chinese "druggists": "I will
look into this drug business", said the Commissioner. "It is very
important that if Chinese merchants are going to carry on such a
business they should do so in a strictly legal way." 5 6
At this point, then, King had no intention of making opiate use
illegal. On June 1, the Province reported, King received a
deputation of local Chinese interested in anti-opium legislation. On
June 3, King made the following statement to the assembled
Commission, "My own opinion is that it should be made
impossible to manufacture this drug in any part of the Dominion.
We will get some good out of this riot yet." 57 In the course of three
days government policy regarding psychoactive substances was
effectively changed.
On July 3, 1908 King presented his "Report on the Need for the
Suppression of the Opium Traffic in Canada", to Rodolphe
Lemieux, the then Minister of Labour; three weeks later Canada
would officially proscribe the importation, sale and manufacturing
of opium. The report noted that opium smoking was increasing
among young white men and women and that considerable profits
were being made by the Chinese merchants. 58 Not surprisingly, the
report also noted the support of many Chinese Canadians in efforts
to suppress the trade. King led no precise evidence as to the
physiological or psychological harm occasioned by opiate use but
relied rather upon substantiated claims of "dire influence". 59 The
crusade was a moral crusade, to King's way of thinking. King
appeared, though, quite unable to unravel the moral logic on which
his desire for criminalization was premised.
The literature to date reveals confusion as to how to interpret all
of this history - how to interpret the genesis of Canada's first laws
prohibiting psychoactive substances. Dolinski has suggested that,
".. . it was primarily the necessity to provide an ideological

smokescreen to appease the white workers on the west coast that
prompted this legislation." 60 Small, Solomon and Madison, and
Green have argued rather that not only economic, but also political
56. lbid, May 29, 1908.
57. Ibid, June 3, 1908.
58. W.L.M. King, "The Need for the Suppression of the Opium Traffic in
Canada", Sessional Papers, 1908, No. 36b.
59. King spoke of "ugly and horrible evidence" of dire influence - a "pretty and
young" woman found in an opium den.
60. Dolinski, note 2, supra, at 41.
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and cultural conflict gave rise to the 1908 statute: these authors have
implicitly rejected a monolithic interpretation of law creation.
Our empirical consideration of the origins of Canadian narcotics
legislation appears similarly to reject such a monolithic interpretation. As C. Wright Mills noted in 1959, ". . . we must always be
historically specific and open to complexities. The simple Marxian
view makes the big economic man the real holder of power; the
simple liberal view makes the big political man the chief of the
power system; and there are some who would view the warlords as
61
virtual dictators. Each of these is an oversimplified view."1
Indeed, it is only when we examine the workings of Canadian
industrialists, Canadian politicians and our domestic military - the
R.C.M.P. 62 - that a clear picture of the genesis and proliferation
of "narcotics" legislation begins to emerge.
The owners of West Coast industry induced the opium smoking
Chinese labourer to come to British Columbia to work for 10 times
what could be attained for similar kinds of work in China. A
particularly rapid climb in Oriental immigration in the summer of
1907 gave rise to an Anti-Asiatic riot in Vancouver that fall, a riot
initiated by white workers. The Vancouver Trades and Labour
Council, perceiving the Orientals as an economic threat, had called
for the immediate exclusion of all Asiatics.
When Mackenzie King, then Canada's Deputy-Minister of
Labour, came to Vancouver to settle Chinese claims arising out of
the 1907 riot, he was "startled" by the massive nature of the
Chinese opium industry. His initial response was to call for the
licensing of these Chinese druggists. King was not about to
criminalize the drug intake of a particular race; he had spoken out
against unequal treatment of the Chinese. It was only when "the
61. C. Wright Mills, The PowerElite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959),
at 277.
62. It might be argued that the R.C.M.P. is simply an arm of the political power of
the state. While this can be seen to be in large measure true, it can also be seen that
the R.C.M.P. may have disagreements with Parliament that tend to reveal the
force's own unique perspective. Consider, for example, the interaction of the
R.C.M.P. and the present Liberal government.
More importantly, by viewing the R.C.M.P. as the "domestic military" here,
we can see the particular interests of those who are actually charged with the duty
of enforcing law. Narcotics legislation requires anticipatory policing; the strategy
of control, as we shall see, is largely determined by the outcomes of such
cat-and-mouse maneouvering. A failed attempt at control brings a demand for
greater severity of punishment and increased certainty of apprehension.
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better class of Chinese" 63 requested state intervention that King
was moved to legislate. The support of these Chinese then elevated
King to the status of "moral entrepreneur"; he moved swiftly and
decisively against the use of opium. The clash of white and Chinese
workers that was induced and nourished6 4 by West Coast
industrialists had given rise to King's 1908 Commission. When
affluent and powerful Chinese Canadians spoke out against opiate
use, King could see a means of "getting good out of this riot." His
demand for the exclusion of opium displayed an unarticulated kind
of moral logic.
King could not be seen to be concerned about the mental and
physical harm occasioned by opiate use: he led no useful evidence
of such harm. Indeed, King's understanding of psychoactive
substances was essentially muddled. While travelling to India King
wrote approvingly of the practice of eating opium: he was able to
distinguish the eating of the drug from the smoking of it. King
remarked that ". . . opium was used in India at certain seasons by
the natives as a preventive against dysentery. It was taken in the
form of pills - one might say for medicinal reasons - . . . in
much the same manner that spirits would be taken by Englishmen
•..there was little smoking save in these (very northern) parts. ' 6 5
This apparent lack of pharmacological understanding makes clear
that Canada's decision to make opiate use illegal was not
substantially the product of an ethic of consumer protection. The
legislation is better understood as reflecting a fear of socioeconomic and socio-cultural assimilation, a fear that was
exacerbated by the Chinese who were successfully making their
way in the young nation of Canada. These Chinese were already
well acculturated to the ideology of upward material mobility; they
did not want anti-Chinese sentiments to grow in this plush new land.
The practice of opium smoking could serve to differentiate, could
63. In a letter to Prime Minister Laurier, Chinese clergyman S. D. Chown
responded to a request for information on the opium trade in B.C. Chown argued
that 'the better class of Chinese in Canada are strongly in favour of putting an end
to it". Personal Correspondence, Mackenzie King Papers, Public Archives of
Canada, 7294-7297.
64. We must remember that, with the imposition of the $500 head tax, Chinese
immigration dramatically declined. The industrialists' replacement of cheap
Chinese labour with cheap Japanese labour tended only to nourish anti-Asiatic
sentiment. It was perhaps ironic that the frustrations of the white workers were
directed at their lesser paid brethren, the Asiatic workers.
65. King Diaries, Mackenzie King Papers, note 43, supra, at 203.
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provide a focus for a cultural backlash. Mackenzie King, it would
seem, could not confront the reality of this paranoia - the reality of
his and others' fears of cultural conflict and assimilation.
Dolinski's claim that the 1908 legislation was "prompted" by the
need to appease white workers can now be seen as only partly true:
there is a reluctance here to distinguish between intention and
effect. While one can assemble evidence to demonstrate that the
legislation was, in practice, aimed at the Chinese "coolie" opium
smoker, 66 one can find no evidence to suggest that this legislation
was intended as an appeasement. It is fair to say that the legislation
was ultimately economic in its origin. Had it not been for the greed
of West Coast industrialists the Chinese opium smoker would not
have come to Canada and competed in a tightening labour market.
Had it not been for the lucrative profits to be enjoyed from the trade,
the British would never have forced the habit on the Chinese in the
mid-nineteenth century.
But it is not historically correct to assert that economic power
alone gave rise to this legislation. It is only through regarding the
more complex duality of economic and political power that we can
understand the 1908 legislation. It is perhaps then the problematic
nature of hierarchy, and not simply the problematic nature of
economic hierarchy, that we need to be sensitive to here. As T. R.
Bottomore has remarked, "This confrontation between the concepts
of 'ruling class' and 'political elite' shows, I think, that, while on
one level they may be totally opposed, as elements in wide-ranging
theories which interpret political life . . . in very different ways, on
another level they may be seen as complementary concepts, which
refer to different types of political systems or to different aspects of
67
the same political system."
Our efforts to dissect theoretically are now empirically informed.
We are cast back to our original contention. The material life of
early twentieth century Canada produced contradictions that
required an ideational resolution. The ideational resolution cannot
be divorced from the hierarchy implicit in the materialism 68 of the
66. In the Vancouver Province of 1907 and 1908 one finds much talk of the
Chinese "coolie" labourer. Virtually every issue of the paper in this time period
contains an article with expressions of anti-Asiatic sentiment. Most of this hostility
is directed against the "Chinese coolie" labourer.
67. T. B. Bottomore, Elites in Society (Penguin Books: Middlesex, England,
1964), at 44.
68. See Marxism ForAndAgainst, note 7, supra, at 82.
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day and the material conditions cannot be meaningfully detached
from an ideational superstructure.
The greed of West Coast industrialists inspired the Chinese
opium smoker to come to Canada; the "competition" that his cheap
labour presented to an established labour movement required
political resolution. The government did not choose to regulate the
labour/capital relationship but rather compensated the victims of
trade unionist anger and quite inadvertently constructed a new
criminal law.
In a theoretical context it is a scenario that provides powerful
support for a materialist view of history. The scenario virtually
confirms a vulgar kind of economic determinism: an economic base
dominates and shapes the process of criminalization.
The caveat that can be introduced at this point, though, is one of
overwhelming theoretical and empirical significance. There is an
important definitional problem inherent in the term "economic".
As Heilbroner has noted, "The intermingling of nonmaterial
activities with material ones, the suffusion of ideational elements
throughout the body of society, the inextricable unity of "social"
and "economic" life, make it difficult to draw boundaries around
the material sphere." 69
We return to our impasse. The notion of dialectical materialism
and the notion of a conflicting plurality of interests are most
appropriately viewed as complementary.
The mistake of much sociology of law has been to regard one
analysis as necessarily a refutation of the other. 7 0 While the
ideological sentiments of these two positions may differ (the
optimism of democratic pluralism and the pessimism of
materialism) it appears that both are capable of enhancing our
understanding of social life and hence of the process of
criminalization.
2. The Social Construction of CriminalPathology: The Proliferation of ProsecutorialPowers 1908-1929
The year 1908 saw other federal legislation regulating the marketing
the deceptively innocuous
of psychoactive substances 69. Ibid, p. 84.
70. This is a pitfall encountered by both pluralists and materialists.
See R. Quinney's Class, State and Crime (New York: David McKay, 1977),
and Hagan and Leon, "Rediscovering Delinquency. .. " (1977), 42 American
SociologicalReview, 587.
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Proprietary or Patent Medicine Act.71 This Act required, among
other things, that pharmaceutical manufacturers label patent
medicines that contained heroin and cannabis. Green has noted of
the attached penalty provisions here that:
". .. despite the fact that far more persons were at risk to drug
addiction as a result of the indiscriminate marketing of
opiate-containing patent medicines than opium smoking - the
maximum first and subsequent offence penalties for manufacture,
importation or sale of prohibited or unlabelled scheduled
drugs
72
were fines of fifty and one hundred dollars, respectively.
The relatively mild nature of the penalties accompanying the
improper use of patent medicines has been explained both by the
perception of a greater "moral degeneration occasioned by opium
smoking, and more simply, by the racial nature of such use." 73 It is
perhaps fair to say that the moral degeneration complained of was to
be found in the consciousness of the opium-smoking Chinese
labourer of early twentieth century British Columbia.
This individual was not using opium as a means of relieving pain
but rather as a pleasurable means of altering consciousness. The
opium den functioned in much the same way as did the typically
Caucasian saloon. The intake of the drug was perceived by both
groups of experientially informed consumers as socially desirable
behaviour. Nevertheless, the newly arrived mode of consciousness
alteration was never compared with the prevalent use of alcohol the existent mode of consciousness alteration. 74
The prohibitive 1908 legislation imposed a heavy burden on
smokers of opium. The criminal status of the opium business
increased the risk of the enterprise; the increased risk was passed on
to the consumer in the form of increased prices. The law had created
a false scarcity; the business of smuggling opium was becoming a
highly lucrative enterprise.

71. The Proprietaryor PatentMedicine Act, S.C. 1907-08, c. 56.
72. Green, note 2, supra, at 48.
73. Ibid. Green has suggested that these two explanations of statutory distinction
are "alternative" explanations. In fact it may be more appropriate to view the
explanations as complementary.
74. This is perhaps ironic, in light of the fact that most dismissals from the
Vancouver police force came as a consequence of being drunk on duty (there were
no indications of dismissal for opium use; there was no indication of police opium
use). Board of Police Commissioners 1905-1911, Vancouver City Police,
Vancouver City Archives, Vancouver, British Columbia.
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In 1910, in response to charges that Chinese smugglers were
working in collaboration with corrupt customs officials, the Federal
Government established The Royal Commission to Investigate
Alleged Chinese Frauds and Opium Smuggling on the Pacific
Coast. 75 The Commission's conclusion essentially urged Draconian
measures in an effort to rid Canada of opiate use. The smoking and
possession of opium were judged to be in need of prohibition; police
powers of search and seizure similarly required expansion.
Without possession being made illegal, then, prosecution of
opium use was problematic. The domestic military - the police required greater powers if they were to be at all successful in their
cat-and-mouse harassment of the Chinese opium industry. To the
dimensions of economic and political power could now be added the
dimension of military power - the power of those whose duty it
was to enforce the law.7 6 The domestic military would, with the
creation of a drug enforcement branch of the R.C.M.P., ultimately
exercise a leadership role in the growth of state powers relating to
77
certain forms of drug use.
With the introduction of The Opium and Drug Act of 1911
Canada moved to make criminal the actual use of a psychoactive
substance; the state policy of controlling the entrepreneurs of the
opium industry had been subverted by customs officials - the
state's own agents. Drastic measures were thought necessary. As
King noted, in moving second reading of the Bill, "The police have
found that the present legislation is not drastic enough, or broad
enough, to give them the powers of seizure and confiscation which
they regard as necessary. One of the objects of the present Bill is to
make more drastic the regulations in that regard."78 The decision to
make opiate use illegal was not, then, founded on the premise that
use leads to crime but rather on the observation that the present
75. Canada, Proceedingsof the Royal Commission to InvestigateAlleged Chinese
Fraudsand Opium Smoking on the Pacific Coast, Sessional Paper, 1910-11.
76. This analysis would tend to be consistent, then, with that of C. Wright Mills in
The PowerElite, though a word of caution from Bottomore seems appropriate here.
Bottomore argues that the concept of pluralistic elites, in eliminating the idea of a
ruling class, ". . .also excludes that of classes in opposition and so. .. arrives at
an extremely pessimistic account (North) American society".
77. In 1920 the federal Department of Health was given the responsibility of
supervising the enforcement of the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act. Later in that
year the drug enforcement branch of the R.C.M.P. was created.
78. Dominion of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1910-1911, Ottawa,
King's Printer, at 2519.

122 The Dalhousie Law Journal

methods of control were inadequate. Indeed, section 4(2) of the
1911 Act went so far as to make it illegal to be in a "house, room or
79
place" where opium was smoked.
In explaining the intent of the 1911 legislation to the House of
Commons, King read out letters from many prominent Canadians,
concerned generally about the non-medical use of psychoactive
drugs, and most specifically about the practice of opium smoking.
King read letters solicited from the police chiefs of Vancouver and
Montreal. The Vancouver chief urged that possession of opium be
made illegal, and that there be "close supervision of the waterfront
of Vancouver to prevent smuggling . . ."80; the police chief of

Montreal had requested that cocaine be added to the schedule of
prohibited substances. The Montreal chief had claimed that "...
according to the medical men the cocaine produces worse effects
than opium."'8 King also read approvingly the following lines from
the Montreal Witness of November, 1910 "Alcoholism and
of
morphine are nothing to cocaine. It is the agent for the seduction
82
our daughters and the demoralization of our young men."
It was in the context, then, of unknowing paranoia that opium and
cocaine use were made illegal. Mackenzie King had become
Canada's narcotics "expert"; his presence dominated the House of
Commons Debates on the appropriateness of the 1911 legislation.
Indeed King had rambled on in his introduction to the legislation to
such an extent that a member of the opposition was moved to
comment, "The minister seems to be giving himself unnecessary
trouble in presenting (these) communications to us. I have not heard
of anyone opposed to the Bill. The Minister of Labour will soon be
as bad as the Minister of Agriculture in taking up the time of the
House." 83
The House of 1911 was not, then, reluctant to endorse the
principle of prohibiting cocaine and opium use. What was at issue
was the manner in which this goal could be most appropriately
effected. King wanted to give the Cabinet the power to add
substances to the schedule of prohibited drugs: he did not want the

79. An Act to prohibit the improperuse of Opium and other Drugs, 1-2 George V.
c. 17, s. 4(2).

80.
81.
82.
83.

See note 72, supra, at 2523.
Ibid, 2524.
Ibid, 2525.
Ibid, 2527.
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subject of adding new drugs to be brought up for discussion in the
House of Commons.
The Leader of the Opposition, Robert Borden, argued, "I would
like to emphasize the point that the entire pharmacopoeia might be
added by order in council to this schedule . ..I think that this is the
first time that criminal legislation by order in council has ever been
attempted." '8 4 As a consequence of the urgings of Borden and
others, King modified section 14 of the Act. While the section
initially allowed the Governor-in-Council to "add to the schedule to
this Act any substance, the addition of which is by him deemed
necessary in the public interest", King ultimately proposed the
more modest, "any alkaloids, derivatives or preparations of the
drugs named in the said schedule."85
What the Commons debate here brought to light was the nature of
the term "drug". A member of the Opposition had noted, "We
might pass this Act just as it is, and the Governor in Council will
still be free to add tobacco to that schedule. The Governor in
Council are taking a power without any limit." ' 86 Another member
actually invited King to include tobacco in the Schedule. King
remarked that, "Cigarettes and tobacco have not yet been
considered a drug, and it is advantageous to deal with only one class
of subjects at this time.' '87 He also argued that, ". . . in naming the
three drugs, cocaine, morphine and opium, parliament makes it
plain that it is legislating against what are known as habit forming
drugs."18 8 The exclusion of tobacco from such a categorization did
not represent pharmacological reality, but it nicely represented the
socio-political reality of the day. This was, unfortunately, a reality
89
that Parliament was not inclined to explain.
The 1911 statute also did not require the intention of possession
to be proven by the Crown: the accused was required to rebut a
presumption of guilt if found in physical possession. King justified
the shift of onus from the state to the individual with the premise
that convictions might be made impossible otherwise. He argued
84. Ibid, 2534.
85. Ibid, 2532, and see The Opium andDrug Act, note 79, supra.
86. Ibid, 2540.
87. Ibid, 2540.
88. Ibid, 2549.
89. King's exclusion of tobacco from the category of drug begs pharmacological
and political explanation; the House's lack of political pharmacological
sophistication would seem to have precluded the necessity for such.
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that, "As to the insertion of the world 'knowingly', I am informed
that this is a favourite word with the legal profession, but its
insertion here, I fear, would make it practically impossible to secure
a conviction, and would have the effect of nullifying the
legislation."- 90 King's hypothesis here, while in no manner
supported by empirical evidence, nevertheless went unchallenged in
Parliament: drastic measures were thought necessary to curtail the
trade in "drugs". King, too, was highly respected as both a
narcotics "expert" and a "moral reformer". 91
With the initial 1908 legislation, participation in the Shanghai
Opium Commission, and presentation of the 1911 statute,
Mackenzie King had achieved a position of prominence - he had
become, in the words of Small and others, 9 2 a successful moral
entrepreneur. King's commitment to the view of non-medical drug
use as morally degenerative is, however, somewhat suspect. There
is little doubt that King was a committed entrepreneur: he
successfully marketed two statutes that made certain drugs illegal.
King's moral vision, however, seems to have sprung more from his
instinct of political survival than from strong moral commitment.
He wrote of the Indian opium trade while en route to the Shanghai
Commission, ". . .1 would learn the part that opium played in the
life of the people. Some persons, for example, were of the opinion
that opium was used by many of the Sikhs in the same way that he
(Lord Morley) was using the cigar which he smoked; that it did not
appear to harm them in that climate when used in moderation; that if
taken from them it might lead to other drugs being used. . . (Lord
Morley) would give me the names of one or two gentlemen to whom
I could speak freely as to conditions in India; they would give me a
true statement of conditions, not to be given, for example, to the
people in North Waterloo, but which I might impart privately to Sir
Wilfrid. I would be informed on the real conditions so that the
'93
Government of Canada might be made fully aware of them."
King seemed to recognize that there was more than one side to this
90. House of Commons Debates, note 78, supra, at 2537.
91. Ibid, 2539-40. (Note the lengthy tribute to King's role as "moral reformer").
92. The term "moral entrepreneur" was first envisioned by Howard Becker in his
well-known sociological treatise, Outsiders (infra, note 142). The moral
entrepreneur can be described as an individual whose commitment to a "correct"
mode of social behavior is highly intense. This commitment is successfully
marketed when'"communicated" to the people through the medium of law.
93. King Diaries, Mission to the Orient, 1907-09, Public Archives of Canada, at
85-86.
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story of the morally degenerative effects of opium; the Canadian
public could be told one point of view and the Cabinet quite
another.
Some 12 years later there would again be a singularity of message
delivered to the Canadian people. In the words of Judge Emily
Murphy, "every drug-fiend is a liar ... these ashy-faced,
half-witted droolers; these unfortunate cringing creatures." ' 94 The
next decade, however, would see little legislative initiative; it would
not be until 1921 that the Government would be moved to
substantially amend The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act of 1911.
Legislative amendments in 1919 and 1920 established more strict
controls on the legal trade in opium, but they were not primarily
directed towards a more harsh treatment of non-medical use. 95 As
Green has said of these amendments, "Parliament . . . seemed
concerned to restrict the easy dissemination of opiate-containing
nostrums for reasons of public health security, and the major
resistance came from those opposed to the "repressive and
restrictive measures" drafted to improve regulation of the medical
and pharmaceutical profession". 9 6 Indeed, the member for
Muskoka, a medical doctor, urged that ". . . this Bill is going to
work a great hardship to the people ...the ordinary people still
have some rights and . . . these rights ought to be preserved .. .
(the Bill) proposes to debar ordinary people from buying, for
instance, some tincture of opium to have convenient for medicinal
purposes." ' 97 The member later asked more pointedly, "Has there
been any demand from the public for these restrictive measures?" 9 8
The Minister of Health, the Honourable N. W. Rowell, essentially
replied in the negative when he said, "This Bill is rendered
necessary only by virtue of the provisions of the International
Opium Convention settled at the Hague and brought into force by
the ratification of the Treaty of Peace." 9 9 The 1919 and 1920
amendments, were, then, dictated by international law.
The 1921 and 1922 amendments, and the 1923 consolidation of
the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act has been characterized by Green
94. Emily Murphy, The Black Candle (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1922), at 16.
95. An Act to amend The Opium and Drug Act, S.C. 1919, c. 25. An Act to Amend
the Opium andNarcoticDrug Act, S.C. 1920, c. 31.
96. Green, note 2, supra, at 52.
97. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1920, at 1746.
98. Ibid, 1748.
99. Ibid, 1749.
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as reflecting a "get tough" approach. 10 0 The Opium and Narcotic
Drug Branch of the Department of Health, and its enforcement arm,
the R.C.M.P., had embarked upon anti-"drug" work in 1920.101
As Solomon and Madison have remarked, "Given their clear
mandate, apparent expertise and control over public information,
these agencies became the most powerful, well-organized lobby for
expansion of the drug laws." 10 2 During the same period of time
anti-Asiatic sentiment in British Columbia continued to swell; the
image of the Chinese drug pedlar provoked considerable
hostility. 1 0 3 With these two forces in action, the proliferation of
prosecutorial powers became virtually inevitable.
Prior to passage of the 1921 statute, the Minister of Health had
commented in the House, ".

.

. I think that dealers of these drugs

generally have come to recognize the fact that the department means
business. The mounted police have been co-operating with the
department to the fullest possible extent .

..

Many of the

convictions secured during the year have been the result of the
operations of the mounted police.' 0 4 The 1921 amendments
clearly displayed the fact that the department meant business; the
maximum penalty of imprisonment for the importation, manufacture, and sale of narcotics was increased from one year to seven
years. 10 5 An individual simply found occupying the premises in
which drugs were found was to be convicted of possession unless
there was proof that ".

.

. the drug was there without his authority,

knowledge or consent, or that he was lawfully entitled to the
possession thereof" 0 6 : supplying drugs to minors was made
exclusively an indictable offence.
In May of 1922 the Minister of Health explained to the House of
Commons the need for a substantial increase in budgetary funds
100. Green, note 2, supra, at 56. Green describes only the 1921 amendments in
this light. It might be more appropriate to view all legislative changes 1921-1923 as
reflecting a "get tough" approach; the following text attempts to support this
contention.
101. The word 'drug' ought to be placed in quotations when used in the context of
substance criminalization. To do otherwise is to leave the reader with the
impression that nicotine, caffeine, and alcohol are not properly conceived of as
drugs.
102. Solomon and Madison, note 2, supra, at 258.
103. See most especially Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1922, 3013-3019.
104. House of Commons Debates, 1921, at 3131.
105. An Act to amend The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, S.C. 1921, c. 42, s.
l(e).
106. Ibid, s. l(d).
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allotted to The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act. The Honourable H.
S. Beland stated that, "Though the quantity of narcotics entering
into Canada through ordinary, permitted channels has immensely
decreased during the last three years, I am sorry to convey to the
committee the information that the illicit introduction of opium and
its derivatives, such as morphine, heroin and cocaine has
considerably increased.' 1 0 7 The Minister's Report also noted that
634 of the 853 opium and narcotic convictions in the 1921-22 fiscal
year were lodged against "Chinamen".
The 1922 amendments not surprisingly strengthened police
powers of search and seizure and took direct aim at the image of the
Chinese drug pedlar. Section 7 of the Act now enabled the police
officer with "reasonable cause to suspect" to search, without
warrant, any premises other than a dwelling house; section 5a(2) of
the Act now allowed whipping, at the discretion of the judge;
section 10B allowed for the deportation of aliens convicted of drug
offences. 10 8
The House of Commons, in its discussion of the Bill, seemed
primarily concerned with the issues of whipping and deportation.
The House deferred to the "expertise" of the members from British
Columbia in its debate. A member from the city of Vancouver
actually introduced the possibility of whipping in the context of the
debate. F.L. Ladner, Vancouver South, argued that, "The chief
purpose of such an amendment will not be so much in its application
as in its deterrent effect upon those men who contemplate engaging
in this traffic, for when they know that the law contains a proviso of
that kind the dread of being subjected to the lash will effectually
deter them from incurring the risk." 0 9
There was, of course, no useful empirical evidence led to support
this hypothesis of deterrent effect. An Ontario medical doctor who
had been unwilling to support the legislative initiative of whipping
in 1921 now found himself compelled. He argued, "I believe that
the honourable gentlemen who represent British Columbia in this
House are more familiar with this question than the rest of us, even
those of us who are in the medical profession . . . While what the
Minister says is true, that lashing should be kept for certain crimes
of physical violence, I think perhaps moral violence as in this case is
107. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1922, at 2017.
108. An Act to amend the Opium and NarcoticDrug Act, S.C. 1922, c. 36.
109. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1922, at 3015.
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a much more serious crime."'' 1 0 One member of the House went so
far in his support of whipping to assert that, "This crime, to my
mind, is even more serious than the crime of robbery with violence.
To hold a man up at the point of a gun and take his money away
from him is serious of course, but it is not so serious as to give drugs
to a minor and take away his future

. I would much rather have

.

anyone hold me up, and shoot me for that matter, than sell me drugs
and cause me to become a drug addict.""' This view of the drug as
devil revealed that the honourable member had not been checking
all his sources: the empirical reality of legalized opium in China of
1906 showed that only 20 million people in a country of 400 million
in fact desired to use the substance; of these 20 million users the
majority were judged by a British medical doctor to be using in
moderation and to have suffered little detriment as a consequence of
use.

11 2

While this was only the judgment of a single medical doctor, it
stood in striking contrast to viewpoints expressed within the House
of Commons: the debate of the day was only partially informed.
Indeed, we now see that in today's context, Dr. Andrew Weil has
remarked that, "Dependence on opium if stable can be as consistent
with social productivity as dependence on coffee or tobacco." "13
The amendments passed by the House of 1922 would, however,
pay no attention to such information; the minimum penalty for
simply being in possession of a prohibited drug was now six months
4
imprisonment and a $200 fine."1
The 1922 amendments, as noted before, also catered to the image
of the noxious Chinese drug pedlar. H. H. Stevens of Vancouver
noted, ". . . think that the clause the minister is adding providing
for the deportation of aliens will very, very materially strengthen the
Bill and the arm of the law. I also agree with him in his estimate that
a very large proportion of these

. .

.Chinese would be aliens, and

therefore subject to deportation.""1L

5

The concern that some

Chinese drug dealers might be naturalized Canadians, and hence not

deportable, had been raised in the House; members had been
110. Ibid, 3016.
111. Ibid, 3018.
112. Letter from Dr. W. Gray, Peking, 1906, British Documents to the Shanghai
Commission, Mackenzie King Papers,PublicArchives of Canada.
113. WeiI, note 40, supra, at 91.
114. The Opium andNarcotic Drug Act, S.C. 1922, c. 36, s. 2(2).
115. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1922, at 3017.
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assured that substantial deportation of Chinese could take place as a
consequence of the legislation. It was not entirely coincidental,
then, that the Chinese Immigration Act of the following year, 1923,
constructed for the first time an exclusionary policy with respect to
the influx of Chinese into Canada.
The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, 1923 was both a
consolidation and an amendment. Though the Health Minister
explained that the Bill was ". . . mainly a consolidation of the
different acts," 116 there was in fact one important revision, at least
in the contemporary context. Marijuana was added to the list of
prohibited substances with the Health Minister's simple assertion,
"There is a new drug in the schedule" 1 1 7: there was no Commons
discussion of the addition here.1 18
Through the early twenties, then, the social construction of a
criminal pathology had flourished. Drug use had been described by
members of the House of Commons as "illicit desire ...
unscrupulous, . . . fiendish, . . . low beastly crime. . . and more
definitively as a "living hell." 1 19 The one treatise that documents
the ideology of this period of time and no doubt served to shape
some of the.severity of state response is Emily Murphy's most
illuminating The Black Candle.120 Emily Murphy was a police
magistrate and judge of the juvenile court in Edmonton; she had
been commissioned by Maclean's magazine in 1920 to write a series
of articles on the problem of drug abuse; the series ultimately
formed the basis of The Black Candle. As Green has perceptively
noted of this effort, ". . . her style tended more to sensationalist
rhetoric than impartial reportage, and, from an historical perspective, it is clear that her moral and racial biases compromised her
research . . . The effects of the various drugs were not clearly
distinguished, but it hardly mattered as Murphy was convinced that
they all produced the same general sequelae: moral degeneration,
crime, physical and mental deterioration and disease, intellectuai

116. Ibid, 1923, at 2114.
117. Ibid, 2124.
118. The specific reason for the inclusion of marijuana is not clearly discemable.
The LeDain Commission has commented that ". . .a decision was made in 1923,
without any apparent scientific basis nor even any real sense of social urgency".
See note 1, supra at 230.
119. See House of Commons Debates, 1921, 3130; Debates, 1922, 3013-3019;
Debates, 1923, 2114-2124.
120. See note 94, supra.
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and spiritual wastage, and material loss through drug-induced
negligence.' '121
It is instructive to look carefully at the moral logic that Emily
Murphy employed. Her very first words in The Black Candle nicely
set out her argument against drug use. Miss Murphy wrote, "An
opium smoker questioned, "If I should gain heaven for a coin, why
should you be envious?" She responded, "His question is based on
two lies. The smoker does not gain heaven, and we are not
envious." Murphy was not willing to accord to the drug user the
validity of his or her perception. The user, whether imbibing to
alleviate the effects of relative poverty, or existential angst, or
simply partaking so as to enjoy a pleasurable alteration of
consciousness, was in no event to be indulged, let alone tolerated.
Murphy asserted that an opium dream ultimately became ". . .a
terrible hell, a dwelling deadly cold, full of bloody eagles and pale
adders." Murphy was asking the Canadian public to believe that the
consumers of smoking opium were in fact masochists - individuals
who would repeatedly subject themselves to such torturous visions.
What is most interesting about Murphy's work, however, are the
distorted kernels of truth that can be found within it. Murphy argued
that ". . .it would be well for the Government to consider whether
or not (dealers in drugs) should be given the option of a fine. The
profits from the traffic are so high that fines are not in any sense
deterrent.' 122 Judge Murphy was quite correctly asserting that a
fine could be considered by the narcotic entrepreneur as a kind of
overhead: while the fine could cut into one's profit margins, it was
only an economic cost, to be balanced with the other economic costs
of doing business. Murphy seemed unaware, however, of the
human consequence of increasing the severity of penalties
associated with non-medical drug use. The law would serve to
socially construct a criminal pathology. The greater severity of
punishment naturally led to increased business risks, risks that were
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. The heroin
addict became quite literally an individual who had to steal to
support a craving. The legal creation of false scarcity was socially
responsible for the self-fulfilling assertion - the heroin addict as
lowly predator.
121. Green, note 2, supra, at 53.
122. Murphy, note 94, supra. For a good indication of the severity of Murphy's
response, see 190-199.
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Even the use of heroin itself can be seen to have arisen in part as a
consequence of the imposition of criminal law. As Solomon and
Madison have noted, "Although there was substantial profit to be
made in the illicit distribution of smoking opium and morphine, the
illicit heroin trade was more lucrative. Since heroin was three times
as potent as morphine and more readily capable of being diluted, it
provided far greater returns per unit of weight. . . enforcement...
increased the illicit distributor's costs of avoiding arrest and thus
prompted the switch from morphine to heroin." 1 23 The human cost
of the escalation from smoking opium is well described by Dr.
Andrew Weil. Weil remarks that, "Opium forms a relatively
harmless habit in that a high percentage of users can smoke it for
years without developing troublesome problems with tolerance.
Dependence on opium if stable, can be as consistent with social
productivity as dependence on coffee or tobacco. But when
morphine, the active principle of opium is isolated and made
available, problems do appear. In particular a significant percentage
of users (though possibly still a minority) finds it impossible to
achieve equilibrium with habitual use of morphine or with the still
more potent derivative, heroin."'124 The proliferation of heroin use
in the United States and Canada can, then, profitably be seen as the
result of a conscious decision made by the distributors of the drug
industry - a decision necessitated by the risks of increasingly
severe sanctions. Emily Murphy's anti-drug ideology had failed to
comprehend these unintentional consequences of repressive legislation - the complex relations between the intentions and effects of
law.
In her discussion of the different drugs in vogue, Murphy is again
revealed as being unable to look at a piece of information through
more than a single lens. Murphy wrote of "Marahuana - A New
Menace: It appears that in using this poison, the time-sense becomes
impaired in such a way that time appears to pass slowly.' 1 2 5 While
Murphy accurately cites a reported pharmacological effect of time
distortion in the instance of cannabis use, she unnecessarily ascribes
a negative value to this "altered" state of consciousness. As
Andrew Weil has noted, ". . .the phrase disturbance of immediate
memory bristles with negativity. Is it a negative description of a
condition that might just as well be looked at positively? ...the
123. Solomon and Madison, note 2, supra, at 254.
124. Weil, note 40, supra, at 102.
125. Murphy, note 94, supra, at 334.
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ability to live entirely in the present, without paying attention to the
immediate past or future, is precisely the goal of meditation and the
exact aim of many religious disciplines. The rationale behind living
in the present is stated in ancient Hindu writings and forms a
prominent theme of Buddhist and Christian philosophy as well: to
the extent that consciousness is diverted into the past and future both of which are unreal - to that extent is it unavailable for use in
the real here and now.' 2 6 Emily Murphy's deprecation of drug
induced present-centered awareness can also be seen as extending
beyond the boundaries of drug use itself. The culture itself was
necessarily linear in its mode of thought; there was a socioeconomic and socio-cultural abhorrence of present-centred awareness. There was the delay of gratification that was implicit in the
Protestant work ethic, the need for self-control and restraint in the
building of the young state of Canada.
The judiciary of this young state were inclined to go along with
the visions of non-medical drug use proferred by Emily Murphy, the
Department of Health, and the R.C.M.P. While very little case law
is available for the period 1908 to 1929, what analysis there is tends
to suggest that the judiciary strongly supported the use of repressive
measures against drug use. In R. v. Venegratsky, 12 7 a Crown
Appeal from a six month term of imprisonment for trafficking, the
Manitoba Court of Appeal increased the sentence length to three
years with the advice that, "The narcotic problem in Canada is a
very acute one . . . The Government is evidently alarmed at the

existing conditions and determined, if possible, to stamp out this
illegal traffic. In an effort to effect such a laudable object it is
8
entitled to every assistance the Court can legitimately give it."12
A Quebec court in a case of possession of opium, noted of The
Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, ". . .there is no necessity of mens
rea, as there is under the Criminal Code. .. "129 The court-justified
the exclusion of mens rea with the statement that, "If such a
defence could be admitted, it would be very easy to evade the law
and as this law must be, in the public welfare and interest, strictly
interpreted, I find the defendant guilty." ' 3 0

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Weil, note 40, supra, at 91.
Rex. v. Venegratsky (1928), 49 C.C.C. 298(Man. C.A.).
Ibid, at 300.
Rex v. Sung Lung (1923), 39 C.C.C. 187 (Q. Dist. C.).
Ibid, 189.

The Origins of Canadian Narcotics Legislation 133

In R. v. Gordon' 3 ' a medical doctor who gave morphine tablets
to a patient for long term self-administration was successfully
prosecuted. The decision helped to transform the conception of drug
use from a problem for medical pedagogy to an important police
priority.
In Ex parte Wakabayashi' 32 , a fundamental challenge to the
constitutionality of The Opium and NarcoticDrug Act was rejected:
the court would not accept the notion that the Act merely licensed
the running of a particular business. Justice MacDonald of the B.C.
Supreme Court argued that, ". . .1 have no hesitation in holding
that the Act in question is criminal and not licensing legislation...
While such legislation constituted a new crime, it was remedial, in
order, if possible, to destroy an existing evil. It was for the
promotion of public order, safety and morals."'13 3 These decisions,
then, aptly represented judicial sentiments1 34 : as was the case with
Mackenzie King and Emily Murphy, the judiciary appeared unable
to articulate the moral logic on which the repression of "drugs" was
based.
The 1920's saw only two other amendments, the first most
importantly directed at tightening state control over the medical
profession's distribution of drugs. The 1925 amendment allowed
the state to prosecute by indictment the medical profession's
unlawful prescription:' 35 the convicted physician, veterinary
surgeon, or dentist would be subject to a mandatory three month
term of imprisonment in such event. The doctor who believed in
listening to his patient's expressed interests could lose his liberty for
this act of heresy: the state was dictating a mode of "treatment" to
its doctors.
The 1929 revision of the Act was essentially a technical revision,
dominated by the need to tighten loopholes present in the 1923 Act.
Definitional and procedural changes, and a greater control of the
postal service, served to accomplish this loophole tightening;' 36 the
131. Rex v. Gordon (1928), 49 C.C.C. 272.
132. Ex parte Wakabayashi, Ex parte Lore Yip (1928),
(B.C.S.C.).

49 C.C.C. 392

133. Ibid, 400-401.
134. For a good discussion of the technical changes imposed by case law
1908-1929, see Green, note 2, supra.
135. An Act to amend the Opium andNarcoticDrug Act, S.C. 1923, c.20, s.5.
136. To see this point most clearly compare the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act,
R.S.C. 1927, c.144, with An Act to amend and consolidate the Opium and
NarcoticDrug Act, S.C. 1929, c.49, 1929.
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anti-drug philosophy remained unchanged. The 1929 Act did,
however, contain the introduction of one rather remarkable
prosecutorial weapon: section 22 required a superior court judge to
grant an exclusive writ of assistance when requested. The writ of
assistance, aptly described as "a blanket warrant authorizing the
holder to search for controlled drugs anywhere and at any time",
was established in The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act: a substantial
and not demonstrably necessary invasion of civil liberty was
effected here. The Health Minister, in introducing the Bill, had only
mentioned in passing "Provision is being made for the issuing of
writs of assistance to certain officers engaged in narcotic drug work,
as is done under the customs act" 13 7: there was no debate of this
issue in the House.
II. Conclusion
The past twenty years have seen a re-focusing of the academic lens
with respect to the subject of criminality. As John Hagan has
noted, 138 the nineteen-sixties saw a shift in our paradigm of inquiry.
Questions about the origins and psychological correlates of
deviance were displaced by questions about the origins and
development of the process of labeling deviance. The process of
"criminalization"' ' 3 9 became a focus for intensive empirical and
theoretical research.
Much of the work of this decade was impressive in its scope. Kai
Erikson's study of the construction of deviance in the midst of
seventeenth century New England Puritanism' 40 , Joseph Gusfield's
thoughtful analysis of the American Temperance movement' 41 , and
Howard Becker's insightful construction of marijuana use 14 2 are
perhaps the richest examples of this tradition.
In the nineteen-seventies the inquiry became more monolithic in
its focus. The process of criminalization was often explained by the
contradictions created from the labour/capital relationship. From

137. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1929, at 61.
138. J. Hagan, note 70, supra, at 587.
139. "Criminalization" here is used in a context that includes both pre-state
designations of deviance and state labels of criminality.
140. K.T. Erikson, Wayward Puritans(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).
141. J. R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American
Movement (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).
142. H.S. Becker, Outsiders(New York: The Free Press, 1963).
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Britain came The New Criminology143 and a host of sophisticated
critical analyses of the process of criminal law. In the United States
William Chambliss, 44 Richard Quinney, 1 45 and others broke with
pluralist conflict explanations of crime and began to discover the
insights of dialectical materialism.
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that the two forms of
inquiry represented by these two decades can be viewed as
complementary. In the context of the origins of Canadian narcotics
legislation, it is suggested that a change in the labour/capital
relationship in early twentieth century British Columbia required a
political resolution. The opium smoking Chinese labourer had been
induced to come to Canada by West Coast industrialists; his cheap
labour was both resented and feared by established trade unionists.
The tendency of West Coast capital towards expansion through
the medium of cheap labour had perhaps unforeseen consequences.
Trade unionists developed Anti-Asiatic sentiment to the point of
physical violence and property destruction. Such oppressive
behavior required government intervention and hence political
resolution.
The interchange of ideas that constructed Canadian narcotics
legislation was not a happy reminder of an informed egalitarian
expression of shared values. The interaction of powerful Chinese
Canadians and the Canadian government forged this political
resolution: the criminalization of opium was ultimately urged by
both groups as a means of "getting good" out of Anti-Asiatic
sentiment. With introduction into proscriptive law, certain forms of
drug use quickly became intolerable to those whose duty it was to
enforce such proscription. The police - the domestic military urged control-oriented "reforms" in their cat-and-mouse maneouvering with the drug industry.
It is a scenario that vividly asserts the validity of materialism as a
world view. But it is also a scenario that confirms political life as
the interchange of ideas. The contradictions of hierarchical
relationships require political resolution. And political resolution
seeks to re-shape or to stabilize the nature of specific power-based
relationships.
143. I. Taylor, P. Walton, and J. Young, The New Criminology (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
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The emergence of Canadian narcotics legislation reveals a
portrait of a reflexive process in historical context. As Berger and
Luckmann have said, ". . .such intrinsically biological functions as
orgasm and digestion [and drug use] 14 6 are socially structured.
Society also determines the manner in which the organism is used in
activity; expressivity, gait and gesture are socially structured . . .
society sets limits to the organism as the organism sets limits to
society." In the context of Canada's prohibition of "narcotics",
state control has had the effect of inhibiting awareness of the
pharmacological reality of psychoactive drug use: the Canadian
citizenry has, however, not been entirely acquiescent; the reflexive
relationship of the controllers and the controlled continues into
1983.
Those of us who seek the democratic spirit of egalitarianism
cannot take cheer in the origins of Canadian narcotics legislation.
The moral logic on which certain psychoactive substances were
made illegal is never articulated: empirical study presents a picture
of a problem created by economic greed, resolved by the holders of
political power, and exacerbated by the perceived need to
increasingly repress.
Though the portrait is one that lends strong support to a
materialist view of criminalization, there is no power to predict the
future; it is the necessary product of a socially and hence
ideationally constructed reality. We are catapulted into the present,
materially 14 7 and ideationally, and hence come full circle.

146. Berger and Luckmann, note 6, supra, at 203, "[and drug use]" my own
addition.
147. Andrew Weil has ironically argued that "...drugs are merely means to
achieve states of nonordinary awareness and must not be confused with the
experiences themselves. They have the capacity to trigger highs; they do not
contain highs. Moreover, the experiences they trigger are essentially no different
from experiences triggered by more natural means ... the real risk of using drugs
as the primary method of altering consciousness is in their tendency to reinforce an
illusory view of cause and effect that makes it ultimately harder to learn how to
maintain highs without dependence on the material world" Weil, note 40, supra.

